READING ON THE STATUTE OF USES. 321 



land to the use of the feoffee s will, or in pios usus ? So 



favourably they took the intent in those days, like as you 



may find in 37 H. VI. that if a man had appointed his 37 H. e. 36. 



use to one for life, the remainder in fee to another, and 



cestuy que use for life had refused, because the intent ap- Sug. Gilb. 217. 



peared not to advance the heir at all, nor him in reversion, n - Coup. 



presently the feoffee should make the estate for life of him 



that refused, some ways to the behoof of the feoffor. But 



to proceed in some better order towards the disproof of this 



opinion of imitation, there be four points wherein we will 



examine the nature of uses. 



1. The raising of them. 



2. The preserving of them. 



3. The transferring of them. 



4. The extinguishing of them. 



1. In all these four you shall see apparently that uses 

 stand upon their own reasons, utterly differing from cases 

 of possession. I would have one case showed by men learned 

 in the law, where there is a deed; and yet there needs a. 

 consideration; as for parole, the law adjudgeth it too light 

 to give a use without consideration ; but a deed ever in law 

 imports a consideration, because of the deliberation and 

 ceremony in the confection of it : and therefore in 8 Reginte 

 it is solemnly argued, that a deed should raise a use with 

 out any other consideration. In the queen s case a false 

 consideration, if it be of record, will hurt the patent, but 

 want of consideration doth never hurt it ; and yet they say 

 that a use is but a nimble and light thing ; and now, con 

 trariwise, it seemeth to be weightier than any thing else : 

 for you cannot weigh it up to raise it, neither by deed, nor 

 deed inrolled, without the weight of a consideration ; but 

 you shall never find a reason of this to the world s end, in 

 the law : but it is a reason of chancery, and it is this : 



That no court of conscience will inforce donum gratuitum, 2 Roll. Abr. 

 though the intent appear never so clearly, where it is not 785.pfow.303. 

 executed, or sufficiently passed by law; but if money had ^Ke 60 ^ 337 

 been paid, and so a person damnified, or that it was for 2 Vern. 239. 

 the establishment of his house, then it is a good matter in 

 the chancery. So again I would see in all the law, a case 

 where a man shall take by conveyance, be it by deed, 

 livery, or word, that is not party to the grant : I do not say 

 that the delivery must be to him that takes by the deed, for 

 a deed may be delivery to one man to the use of another. 

 Neither do I say that he must be party to the livery or 

 deed, for he in the remainder may take though he be 



VOL. xin. Y 



