READING ON THE STATUTE OF USES. 337 



title of wardship, should oust a rcconuzee of a statute, or 

 a termor: So again we see, that the statute of mortmain 

 was made to preserve the lord s escheats and wardships. 

 Ihe tenant in dower is so much favoured, as that it is the 

 common saying and bye-word in the law, that the law 

 iavoureth three things. 



1. Life. 2. Liberty. 3. Dower. 



So in case of voucher, the feme shall not be delayed, but 

 shall recover against the heir maintenant : So likewise for 

 the tenant by courtesy, as it is called, and by the law of 

 England, and therefore specially favoured, as a proper con 

 ceit and invention of our law. So, again, they principally 

 favour such as have ancient rights, and therefore Lett telieth 

 us that it is commonly said that a right cannot die: and 

 that ground of law, that a freehold cannot be in suspense 

 showeth it well, insomuch that the law will rather o-ive the 

 land to the first comer, which we call an occupant, than 

 want a tenant to a stranger s action. 



And again, the other ancient ground of law of remitter 

 showeth that where the tenant faileth without folly in the 

 demandant, the law executeth the ancient right. To con 

 clude, therefore, this part, when this practice of feoffments 

 in use did prejudice and damnify all those persons that the 

 ancient common law favoured, and did absolutely cross the 

 wisdom of the law, which was to have conveyances consi 

 derate and notorious, and to have trial thereupon clear and 

 not inveigled it is no marvel that the statute concludeth, 

 that the subtle imaginations and abuses tended to the utter 

 subversion of the ancient common laws of this realm. 



The third part giveth a touch of the remedy which the 3 

 statute mtendeth to minister, consisting in two parts. 

 l^irst, the extirpation of feoffments. 



Secondly, the taking away of the hurt, damage, and 

 deceit of uses; out of which have been gathered two ex 

 tremities of opinions. 



The first opinion is, that the intention of the statute was 

 discontinue and banish all conveyances in use; groundincv 

 themselves both upon the words, that the statute doth not 

 speak of the extinguishment or extirpation of the use, namely 

 by a unity of possession, but of an extinguishment or extirpa 

 tion of the feoffment, &c. which is the conveyance itself. 



Secondly, out of the words abuse and errors, heretofore 

 sed and accustomed, as if uses had not been at the com 

 mon law, but had been only an erroneous device or practice, 

 lo both which I answer 



VOL. xiii 



