338 READING ON THE STATUTE OF USES. 



To the former, that the extirpation which the statute 

 meant was plain, to be of the feoffee s estate, and not of 

 the form of conveyances. 



To the latter I say, that for the word abuse, that may 

 be an abuse of the law, which is not against law, as the 

 taking of long leases of lands at this day in capite to defraud 

 wardships is an abuse of law, but yet it is according to 

 law, and for the word (errors) the statute meant by it, not a 

 mistaking of the law, but a wandering or going astray, or 

 digressing from the ancient practice of the law, into a bye- 

 course : as when we say, erravimus cum patribus nostris, it 

 is not meant of ignorance, but of perversity. But to prove 

 that the statute meant not to suppress the form of convey 

 ances, there be three reasons which are not answerable. 



The first is, that the statute in every branch thereof hath 

 words dejuturo, that are seised, or hereafter shall be seised ; 

 and whereas it may be said that these words were put in, 

 in regard of uses suspended by discontinuance, and so no 

 present seisin to the use, until a regress of the feoffees; 

 that intendment is very particular, for commonly such cases 

 special are brought in by provisos, or special branches, and 

 not intermixed in the body of a statute ; and it had been 

 easy for the statute to have, &quot; or hereafter shall be seised 

 upon every feoffment, &c. heretofore had or made.&quot; 



My second reason is upon the words of the statute of 

 inrolment, which saith, that (no hereditaments shall pass, 

 &c. or any use thereof, &c.) whereby it is manifest, that 

 the statute meant to leave the form of conveyance with the 

 addition of a farther ceremony. 



The third reason I make is out of the words of the first 

 proviso, where it is said, that no primer seisin, livery, fine, 

 nor alienation, &c. shall be taken for any estate executed 

 27 H. 8. by force of the statute, before the first of May, 1536, but 

 that they shall be paid for uses made and executed in pos 

 session for the time after; where the word made directly 

 goeth to conveyances in use made after the statute, and 

 can have no other understanding ; for the words, executed 

 in possession, would have served for the case of regress : 

 and, lastly, which is more than all, if they have had any 

 such intent, the case being so general and so plain, they 

 would have had words express, that every limitation of use 

 made after the statute should have been void; and this 

 was the exposition, as tradition goeth, that a reader of 

 Gray s Inn, that read soon after the statute, was in trouble 

 for, and worthily, which, I suppose, was Boiser, whose 



