342 HEADING ON THE STATUTE OF USES. 



whereby it is manifest, that the first words are to be un 

 derstood of uses in possession. For there are two substan 

 tial and essential differences of estates; the one limiting 

 the times, for all estates are but times of their conti 

 nuances ; the former maketh like difference of fee-simple, 

 fee-tail, for life or years ; and the other maketh difference 

 of possession as remainder ; all other differences of estate 

 are but accidents, as shall be said hereafter. These two 

 the statute meant to take hold of, and at the words, re 

 mainder and reverter, it stops: it adds not words, right, 

 title, or possibility, nor it hath not general words, or other 

 wise; whereby it is most plain, that the statute meant to 

 execute no inferior uses to remainder or reverter: that is 

 to say, no possibility or contingencies, but estates, only 

 such as the feoffees might have executed by conscience 

 made. Note also, that the very letter of the statute doth 

 take notice of a difference between a use in remainder and 

 a use in reverter; which though it cannot be properly, 

 because it doth not depend upon particular estates, as re 

 mainders do, neither did then before the statute draw any 

 tenures as reversions do; yet the statute intends there is 

 a difference when the particular use, and the use limited 

 upon the particular use, are both new uses, in which case 

 it is a use in remainder; and where the particular use is a 

 new use, and the remnant of the use is the old use, in 

 which case it is a use in reverter. 



The next material words are, from henceforth, which 

 doth exclude all conceit of relation that cestuy que me shall 

 not come in : as from the time of the first feoffments to 

 use, as Brudnell s conceit was in 14 H. VIII. That is, the 

 feoffee had granted a rent charge, and cestuy qm use had 

 made a feoffment in fee, by the statute of 1 R. III. the 

 feoffee should have held it discharged, because the act of 

 cestuy que use shall put the feoffee in, as if cestuy que use 

 had been seised in from the time of the first use limited ; 

 and therefore the statute doth take away all such ambi 

 guities, and expresseth that cestuy que use shall be in pos 

 session from henceforth; that is, from the time of the par 

 liament for uses then in being, and from the time of the 

 execution for uses limited after the parliament. 



The third material words are, lawful seisin, state, and pos 

 session, not a possession in law only, but a seisin in fact ; 

 not a title to enter into the land, but an actual estate. 



The fourth words are, of and in such estates as they had 

 in the use ; that is to say, like estates, fee-simple, fee-tail, 

 for life, for years at will, in possession, and reversion, which 



