READING ON THE STATUTE OF USES. 343 



are the substantial differences of estates, as was expounded 

 by the branch of the fiction of the statute which follows. 



This branch of fiction hath three material words or 

 clauses : the first material clause is, that the estate, right, 

 title, and possession that was in such person, &c. shall be 

 in cestuy que use ; for that the matter and substance of the 

 estate of cestuy que use is the estate of the feoffee, and more 

 he cannot have ; so as if the use were limited to cestuy que 

 use and his heirs, and the estate out of which it was limited 

 was but an estate for life, cestuy que use can have no inhe 

 ritance : so if when the statute came, the heir of the feoffee 

 had not entered after the death of his ancestor, but had only 

 a possession in law, cestuy que use in that case should not 

 bring an assize before entry, because the heir of the feoffee 

 could not; so that the matter whereupon the use might 

 work is the feoffee s estate. But note here : whereas before, 

 when the statute speaks of the uses, it spake only of uses in 

 possession, remainder and reverter, and not in title or right : 

 now when the statute speaks what shall be taken from the 

 feoffee, it speaks of title and right: so that the statute 

 takes more from the feoffee than it executes presently, in 

 cases where there are uses in contingence which are but 

 titles. 



The second word is clearly, which seems properly and Dy. 340. 

 directly to meet with the conceit of scintilla juris, as well * Ial y v - M^ 

 as the words in the preamble of extirpating and extinguish- iAnd*33l,332. 

 ing such feoffments, so as their estate is clearly extinct. Barker v. 



The third material clause is, after such quality, manners, Neale &amp;gt; 2 Mod. 

 form, and condition as they had in the use, so as now as the shortridge v. 

 feoffee s estate gives matter, so the use gives form : and as Lampiugh. 

 in the first clause the use was endowed with the possession Sallt&amp;lt; 678&amp;lt; 

 in points of estate, so there it is endowed with the possession 

 in all accidents and circumstances of estate. Wherein first 

 note, that it is gross and absurd to expound the form of the 

 use any whit to destroy the substance of the estate ; as to 

 make a doubt, because the use gave no dower or tenancy 

 by the courtesy, that therefore the possession when it is 

 transferred would do so likewise : no, but the statute meant 

 such quality, manner, form, and condition, as it is not re 

 pugnant to the corporal presence and possession of the 

 estate. 



Next for the word condition, I do not hold it to be put 

 in for uses upon condition, though it be also comprised 

 within the general words ; but because I would have things 

 stood upon learnedly, and according to the true sense, I 

 hold it but for an explaining, or word of the effect ; as it is 



