THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORK. 15 



appear extraordinary if we sometimes depart from the com 

 mon divisions. For additions, whilst they vary the whole, 

 necessarily vary the parts, and their subdivisions, but the 

 received divisions are only adequate to the received summary 

 of the sciences such as it now exists. 



With regard to what we shall note as omitted, we shall 

 not content ourselves with offering the mere names and 

 concise proofs of what is deficient : for if we refer any 

 thing to omissions, of a high nature, and the meaning of 

 which may be rather obscure (so that we may have grounds 

 to suspect that men will not understand our intention, or 

 the nature of the matter we have embraced in our concep 

 tion and contemplation), we will always take care to subjoin 

 to an instance of the whole, some precepts for perfecting it, 

 or perhaps a completion of a part of it by ourselves. For 

 we consider it to concern our own character as well as the 

 advantage of others, that no one may imagine a mere passing 

 idea of such matters to have crossed our mind, and that 

 what we desire and aim at resembles a wish ; whilst in 

 reality it is in the power of all men, if they be not wanting 

 to themselves, and we ourselves are actually masters of a 

 sure and clear method. For we have not undertaken to 

 measure out regions in our mind, like augurs for divination, 

 but like generals to invade them for conquest. 



AND THIS IS THE FIRST PART OF THE WORK. 



Having passed over the ancient arts, we will prepare the 

 human understanding for pressing on beyond them. The 

 object of the Second Part then is the doctrine touching a 

 better and more perfect use of reasoning in the investigation 

 of things, and the true helps of the understanding ; that it 

 may by this means be raised, as far as our human and 

 mortal nature will admit, and be enlarged in its powers so 

 as to master the arduous and obscure secrets of nature. 

 And the art which we employ (and which we are wont to 

 call the interpretation of nature) is a kind of logic. For 

 common logic professes to contrive and prepare helps and 

 guards for the understanding, and so far they agree. But 

 ours differs from the common, chiefly in three respects, 

 namely, in its end, the order of demonstration, and the 

 beginning of the inquiry. 



For the end of our science is not to discover arguments 

 but arts, nor what is agreeable to certain principles but the 

 principles themselves, nor probable reasons, but designa 

 tions and indications of effects. Hence from a diversity of 

 intention follows a diversity of consequences. For in the 



