i87 3 ] STIRLING AND HEGEL 81 



the point, which is the nerve of the proof, the truth is not 

 as Newton assumes it. (!) And so, upheld by the dictum 

 of this forgotten astronomer, Hegel goes on to inveigh 

 against the mere jugglery by which Newton, already 

 knowing Kepler s results, avails himself of the mist of the 

 infinitely little, to bring out apparent mathematical 

 proof of these results.&quot; 



I naturally add that this judgment not only indicates 

 incredible ignorance of the reasonings of the Principia, 

 but casts a most unfair slur on Newton s honesty. Now, 

 Dr. Stirling does not pretend to say that there is any real 

 error in Newton s reasonings. But he urges (p. 112) that 

 Hegel had been told, if not by Newton, yet certainly by 

 others, that these proofs amount to a supersession of 

 Kepler s discovery ; and that the philosopher s protest 

 is directed simply against this idea. The answer to this 

 apology is that Hegel was told no such thing by any one 

 able to read the Principia ; for, in fact, Kepler s discovery 

 is the express experimental basis of the Newtonian theory. 

 And it is plain from the reference to Schubert that Hegel 

 is objecting, not to some sense put by others on Newton s 

 work, but to that work itself viewed as mathematical 

 reasoning. 1 Hegel, therefore, cannot be defended unless 

 it can be shown that I have misstated the force of his 

 reference to Schubert. This Dr. Stirling accomplishes as 

 follows : 



&quot; Hegel has to allude to an astronomer, Schubert, who 

 shall have admitted that in the point which is the nerve 

 of the proof, it is not exactly so situated as Newton 

 assumes. Mr Smith s manner of stating this is as follows. 

 . . . That one sees is categorical, and to accomplish this 

 categorical effect, Mr. Smith made a break in his quotation, 

 and omitted the italicised not exactly. Yet one might 

 not be very wide of the truth if one said, that very 



1 In dealing with Whewell on this same subject of Kepler and 

 Newton, Dr. Stirling observes, &quot; that what Hegel means by proof is 

 Hegel s own metaphysics &quot; (p. 97). But this observation cannot apply 

 here ; for the defect of proof, which Hegel has heard of from an astro 

 nomer, must be mathematical, not metaphysical. 



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