i.] ADMINISTRATIVE NIHILISM. 27 



whether the State may not promote the acquisition of 

 wealth by indirect means. For example, may the State 

 make a road, or build a harbour, when it is quite clear 

 that by so doing it will open up a productive district, 

 and thereby add enormously to the total wealth of the 

 community ? And if so, may the State, acting for the 

 general good, take charge of the means of communica 

 tion between its members, or of the postal and telegraph 

 services ? I have not yet met with any valid argument 

 against the propriety of the State doing what our 

 Government does in this matter ; except the assumption, 

 which remains to be proved, that Government will 

 manage these things worse than private enterprise would 

 do. Nor is there any agreement upon the still more 

 important question whether the State ought, or ought 

 not, to regulate the distribution of wealth. If it ought 

 not, then all legislation which regulates inheritance the 

 statute of Mortmain, and the like is wrong in principle ; 

 and, when a rich man dies, we ought to return to the 

 state of nature, and have a scramble for his property. 

 If, on the other hand, the authority of the State is legiti 

 mately employed in regulating these matters, then it is 

 an open question, to be decided entirely by evidence as 

 to what tends to the highest good of the people, whether 

 we keep our present laws, or whether we modify them. 

 At present the State protects men in the possession and 

 enjoyment of their property, and defines what that pro 

 perty is. The justification for its so doing is that its 

 action promotes the good of the people. If it can be 

 clearly proved that the abolition of property would tend 

 still, more to promote the good of the people, the State 

 will have the same justification for abolishing property 

 that it now has for maintaining it. 



Again, I suppose it is universally agreed that it would 

 be useless and absurd for the State to attempt to pro- 



