244 CRITIQUES AND ADDRESSES. [x. 



obviously erroneous. And if it means, as the context 

 would seem to show it does, that sensations are the 

 subject-matter of all thought or knowledge, then it is 

 no less contrary to fact, inasmuch as our emotions, which 

 constitute a large part of the subject-matter of thought 

 or of knowledge, are not sensations. 



More eccentric still is the Quarterly Eeviewer s next 

 piece of psychology. 



&quot; Altogether, we may clearly distinguish at least six kinds of action 

 to which the nervous system ministers : 



&quot; I. That in which impressions received result in appropriate 

 movements without the intervention of sensation or thought, as in 

 the cases of injury above given. This is the reflex action of the 

 nervous system. 



&quot; II. That in which stimuli from without result in sensations 

 through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out. 

 Sensation. 



&quot; III. That in which impressions received result in sensations which 

 give rise to the observation of sensible objects. Sensible perception. 



&quot;IV. That in which sensations and perceptions continue to 

 coalesce, agglutinate, and combine in more or less complex aggre 

 gations, according to the laws of the association of sensible percep 

 tions. Association. 



&quot; The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations, con 

 sisting, as they do at the best, but of mere presentative sensible ideas 

 in no way implying any reflective or representative faculty. Such 

 actions minister to and form Instinct. Besides these, we may dis 

 tinguish two other kinds of mental action, namely : 



&quot; V. That in which sensations and sensible perceptions are reflected 

 on by thought, and recognized as our own, and we ourselves recognized 

 by ourselves as affected and perceiving. Self-consciousness. 



&quot; VI. That in which we reflect upon our sensations or perceptions, 

 and ask what they are, and why they are. Eeason. 



&quot; These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations, per 

 formed, as they are, by means of representative ideas implying the 

 use of a reflective representative faculty. Such actions distinguish 

 the intellect or rational faculty. Now, we assert that possession in 

 perfection of all the first four (jpresentative) kinds of action by no 

 means implies the possession of the last two (representative} kinds. 

 All persons, we think, must admit the truth of the following 

 proposition : 



