x.] ME. DARWIN S CRITICS. 245 



&quot;Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but in kind, if we may 

 possess the one in perfection without that fact implying that we possess 

 the other also. Still more will this be the case if the two faculties 

 tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet this is the distinction 

 between the instinctive and the intellectual parts of man s nature. 



&quot;As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the first 

 four groups of actions that they may have, so to speak, mental 

 images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of complexity, as 

 governed by the laws of association. We deny to them, on the other 

 hand, the possession of the last two kinds of mental action. We deny 

 them, that is, the power of reflecting on their own existence, or of 

 inquiring into the nature of objects and their causes. We deny that 

 they know that they know or know themselves in knowing. In other 

 words, we deny them reason. The possession of the presentative 

 1 acuity, as above explained, in no way implies that of the reflective 

 fticulty ; nor does any amount of direct operation imply the power of 

 asking the reflective question before mentioned, as to * what and 

 ; why. &quot; (Loc. cit. pp. G7, 68.) 



Sundry points are worthy of notice in this remarkable 

 account of the intellectual powers. In the first place 

 the Eeviewer ignores emotion and volition, though they 

 are no inconsiderable &quot; kinds of action to which the 

 nervous system ministers,&quot; and memory has a place in 

 his classification only by implication. Secondly, we are 

 told that the second &quot; kind of action to which the 

 nervous system ministers&quot; is &quot;that in which stimuli 

 from without result in sensations through the agency of 

 which their due effects are wrought out. Sensation.&quot; 

 Does this really mean that, in the writer s opinion, 

 &quot;sensation&quot; is the &quot;agent&quot; by which the &quot;due effect&quot; 

 of the stimulus, which gives rise to sensation, is 

 &quot; wrought out &quot; ? Suppose somebody runs a pin into 

 me. The &quot;due effect&quot; of that particular stimulus will 

 probably be threefold ; namely, a sensation of pain, a 

 start, and an inter] ectional expletive. Does the 

 Quarterly Eeviewer really think that the &quot; sensation &quot; is 

 the &quot;agent&quot; by which the other two phenomena are 

 wrought out ? 



