256 CRITIQUES AND ADDRESSES. [x. 



But, if an action, the motive of which is nothing out 

 affection or sympathy, may be deserving of moral appro 

 bation and really good, who that has ever had a dog of 

 his own will deny that animals are capable of such 

 actions ? Mr. Mivart indeed says : &quot; It may be safely 

 affirmed, however, that there is no trace in brutes of any 

 actions simulating morality which are not explicable by 

 the fear of punishment, by the hope of pleasure, or by 

 personal affection&quot; (p. 221). But it may be affirmed, with 

 equal truth, that there is no trace in men of any actions 

 which are not traceable to the same motives. If a man 

 does anything, he does it either because he fears to be 

 punished if he does not do it, or because he hopes to 

 obtain pleasure by doing it, or because he gratifies his 

 affections l by doing it. 



Assuming the position of the absolute moralists, let it 

 be granted that there is a perception of right and wrong 

 innate in every man. This means, simply, that when 

 certain ideas are presented to his mind, the feeling of 

 approbation arises ; and when certain others, the feeling 

 of disapprobation. To do your duty is to earn the appro 

 bation of your conscience, or moral sense ; to fail in your 

 duty is to feel its disapprobation, as we all say. Now, is 

 approbation a pleasure or a pain ? Surely a pleasure. 

 And is disapprobation a pleasure or a pain ? Surely a 

 pain. Consequently all that is really meant by the abso 

 lute moralists is that there is, in the very nature of man, 

 something which enables him to be conscious of these 

 particular pleasures and pains. And when they talk of 

 immutable and eternal principles of morality, the only 

 intelligible sense which I can put upon the words, is that 

 the nature of man being what it is, he always has been, 

 and always will be, capable of feeling these particular 



1 In separating pleasure and the gratification of affection, I simply follow 

 Mr. Mivart without admitting the justice of the separation. 



