xn.] THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION. 295 



snow, white and cold ; and manna, white and sweet, 

 from the ideas they produce in us ; which qualities are 

 commonly thought to be the same in these bodies ; that 

 those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of 

 the other as they are in a mirror ; and it would by most 

 men be judged very extravagant if one should say other 

 wise. And yet he that will consider that the same fire 

 that at one distance produces in us the sensation of 

 warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the 

 far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself 

 what -reason he has to say that his idea of warmth, 

 which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in 

 the fire ; and his idea of pain which the same fire pro 

 duced in him in the same way, is not in the fire. Why 

 are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it 

 produces the one and the other idea in us ; and can do 

 neither but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of 

 its solid parts ? &quot; 



Thus far then materialists and idealists are agreed. 

 Locke and Berkeley, and all logical thinkers who have 

 succeeded them, are of one mind about secondary 

 qualities their being is to be perceived or known 

 their materiality is, in strictness, a spirituality. 



But Locke draws a great distinction between the 

 secondary qualities of matter, and certain others which 

 he terms &quot; primary qualities.&quot; These are extension, 

 figure, solidity, motion and rest, and number ; and he is 

 as clear that these primary qualities exist independently 

 of the mind, as he is that the secondary qualities have 

 no such existence. 



&quot; The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of 

 fire and snow are really in them, whether anyone s senses perceive 

 them or not, and therefore they may be called real qualities, because 

 they really exist in those bodies ; but light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, 



i Locke, &quot;Human Understanding,&quot; Book IT. cliap. viii. 14, 15. 



