XIL] THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION. 315 



Now, from this proposition, the thorough materialists 

 dissent as much, on the one hand, as Berkeley does, upon 

 the other hand. 



The thorough materialist asserts that there is a some 

 thing which he calls the &quot; substance &quot; of matter ; that 

 this something is the cause of all phenomena, whether 

 material or mental ; that it is self-existent and eternal, 

 and so forth. 



Berkeley, on the contrary, asserts with equal confidence 

 that there is no substance of matter, but only a substance 

 of mind, which he terms spirit ; that there are two kinds 

 of spiritual substance, the one eternal and uncreated, 

 the substance of the Deity, the other created, and, once 

 created, naturally eternal ; that the universe, as known to 

 created spirits, has no being in itself, but is the result of 

 the action of the substance of the Deity on the substance 

 of those spirits. 



In contradiction to which bold assertion, Locke affirms 

 that we simply know nothing aboub substance of any 

 kind. 1 



&quot; So that if anyone will examine himself concerning his notion of 

 pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, 

 but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, 

 which are capable of producing simple ideas in us, which qualities are 

 commonly called accidents. 



&quot; If anyone should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or 

 weight inheres 1 he would have nothing to say but the solid extended 

 parts ; and if he were demanded what is it that solidity and extension 

 inhere in ] he would not be in much better case than the Indian 

 before mentioned, who, urging that the world was supported by a 

 great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on 1 to which his 

 answer was, a great tortoise. But being again pressed to know what 

 gave support to the broad-backed tortoise ? replied, something, he knew 



1 Berkeley virtually makes the same confession of ignorance, when he admits 

 that we can have no idea or notion of a spirit (&quot; Principles of Human Know 

 ledge,&quot; 138) ; and the way in which he tries to escape the consequences of this 

 admission, is a splendid example of the floundering of a mired logician. 



