SEC. FAB. CUPID1NIS ET CCELI. 297 



fluit ; altera non tarn fortiter impingitur, altera non 

 tarn constanter inhaeret. Imagines autem illae, contra, 

 et manifestae et constantes putantur ; adeo ut materia 

 ilia prima et communis tanquam accessorium quiddam 

 videatur, et loco sufrulcimenti ; actio autem quaevis tan 

 quam emanatio tantum a forma ; atque prorsus primas 

 partes formis deferantur. Atque hinc fluxisse videtur 

 formarum et idearum regnum in essentiis, materia scili 

 cet addita quadam phantastica. Aucta etiam sunt ista 

 suporstitione nonnulla (errorem, intemperantiam, 1 ut 

 fit, secuta), et idea? abstracts? quoque introductae, et 

 earum dignitates ; tanta confidentia et majestate, ut 

 cohors somniantium vigilantes fere oppresserit. Ve- 

 rum ista ut plurimum evanuerunt ; licet alicui, nostro 

 hoc seculo, curae fuerit ea sponte inclinantia fulcire et 

 excitare, majore ausu (ut nobis videtur) quam fructu. 2 

 Verum quam praeter rationem materia abstracta prin- 

 cipium ponatur (nisi obstent prsejudicia) facile perspici- 

 tur. Formas siquidem separatas quidam actu subsistere 

 posuerunt, 3 materiam separatam nemo ; ne ex iis qui 

 earn ut principium adhibuerunt ; atque ex rebus phan- 



1 [So in original.] The true reading is probably intemperantid. 



2 The allusion is apparently to Patricias, whose Nova Philosophia was 

 published in 1593 ; a work long since so rare that Sorellus (apud Brucker, 

 iv. 28.) says that a small library might be purchased for the price of this 

 single book. See for an account of it Brucker, ubi modo. 



8 Angels are regarded by the schoolmen as forms not immersed in mat 

 ter. Thus St. Thomas says, &quot; Angeli sunt formae immateriales.&quot; Sum. 

 Theol. i. q. 61. Even the soul of man is spoken of as a form &quot; non penitus 

 materiae immersa; &quot; a way of speaking probably employed for two reasons, 

 to save the possibility of the soul s separate existence, and to obviate 

 the difficulty of the Scotists, that an unextended, or intense, form like the 

 soul cannot give extension or corporeity. From this difficulty Duns Scotus 

 deduced the existence of a &quot; forma corporeitatis &quot; distinct from the soul; a 

 doctrine not to be confounded witli that of Avicenna, who, from the impos 

 sibility of conceiving unextended matter, was led to assert the existence 

 f a form of corporeity primitively inherent in all matter. 



