THE SECOND BOOK. 87 



things. For the one I have made as a parent or common 

 ancestor to all knowledge ; and the other I have now brought 

 in as a branch or descendant of natural science. It appeareth 

 likewise that I have assigned to summary philosophy the 

 common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and in- 

 ditterent to several sciences ; I have assigned unto it likewise 

 tlie inquiry touching the operation or the relative and adven- 

 tive characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, 

 possibility, and the rest, with this distinction and provision ; 

 that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not 

 logically. It appeareth likewise that natural theology, which 

 heretofore hath been handled confusedly with metaphysic I 

 have enclosed and bounded by itself. It is therefore now a 

 question what is left remaining for metaphysic ; wherein I may 

 without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of anti 

 quity, that physic should contemplate that which is inherent 

 in matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that 

 which is abstracted and fixed. And again, that physic should 

 handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and 

 moving ; and metaphysic should handle that which supposeth 

 further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But 

 the difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and 

 sensible. _ For as we divided natural philosophy in general into 

 the inquiry of causes and productions of effects, so that part 

 which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide accord 

 ing to the received and sound division of causes. The one 

 part, which is physic, inquireth and handleth the material and 

 efficient causes ; and the other, which is metaphysic, handleth 

 the foxmal and final causes. 



(4) Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and not 

 according to our idiom for medicine) is situate in a middle term 

 or distance between natural history and metaphysic. For 

 natural history describeth the variety of things; physic the 

 causes, but variable or respective causes ; and metaphysic the 

 nxed and constant causes. 



&quot; Limus ut hie durescit, et hsec ut cera liqueseit. 

 Uno eodemque igni.&quot; 



Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay ; fire is 

 the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax. But fire is 

 no constant cause either of induration or colliquation ; so then 

 the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter 

 Ihysic hath three parts, whereof two respect nature united 

 or collected, the third cciitemplateth nature diffused or 



