THE SECOND BOOK. 115 



But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a 

 promise. 



f (6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an 

 invention ; for to invent is to discover that we know not and 

 not to recover or resummon that which we already know 

 and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the know 

 ledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or 

 call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose 

 which we take into our consideration. So as to speak truly it 

 is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an 

 application ; which is the cause why the schools do place it 

 after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Neverthe 

 less, because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an en 

 closed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already 

 obtained the name, let it be called invention; so as it be 

 perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this in 

 vention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not 

 addition or amplification thereof. 



(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two 

 courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of these 

 seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of 

 diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle 

 wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time 

 saying, They did as if one that professed the art of shoe- 

 making should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only 

 exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and 

 sizes. But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should 

 have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken he 

 should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speakin- of 

 divine knowledge, saith, &quot; That the kingdom of heaven is like 

 a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old 

 store ; and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in 

 precept, that pleaders should have the places, whereof they 

 have most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that 

 may be ; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of the 

 law against equity, and contrary ; and to speak for presump 

 tions and inferences against testimony, and contrary. And 

 Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, de- 

 hvereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion 

 to speak of (if he will take the pains), he may have it in effect 

 premeditate and handled in thesi. So that when he cometh to 

 a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names 

 and times, and places, and such other circumstances of indi 

 viduals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes- 

 who, in regaru of the great force that the entrance and access 



