THE SECOND BOOK. 117 



forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance 

 our pursuit. 



XIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which 

 handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations, which as to 

 induction hath a coincidence with invention ; for all inductions, 

 whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind 

 which inventeth, judgeth all one as in the sense. But other 

 wise it is in proof by syllogism, for the proof being not im 

 mediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, 

 and the judgment of the consequence is another ; the one 

 exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real 

 and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which 

 we have spoken of interpretation of Nature. 



(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing 

 most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently 

 and excellently laboured. For the nature of man doth ex 

 tremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed 

 and unmovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And, 

 therefore, as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all 

 motion there is some point quiescent ; and as he elegantly 

 expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas (that stood fixed, and 

 bare up the heaven from falling) to be meant of the poles or 

 axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conrersion is accomplished, 

 so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree 

 within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a per 

 petual peril of falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down 

 some principles about which the variety of their disputations 

 might turn. 



(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of 

 propositions to principles in a middle term. The principles 

 to be agreed by all and exempted from argument ; the middle 

 term to be elected at the liberty of every man s invention ; the 

 reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted : the one 

 when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they 

 term a probation ostensive ; the other, when the contradictory 

 of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the 

 principle, which is that which they call per incommodum, or 

 pressing an absurdity ; the number of middle terms to be as 

 the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from 

 the principle. 



(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the 

 one by way of direction, the other by way of caution : the 

 former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, 

 by the variations and deflections from which errors and in 

 consequences may be exactly judged. Toward the composition 



