118 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 



and structure of which form it is incident to handle the parts 

 thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, 

 which are simple words. And this is that part of logic which 

 is comprehended in the Analytics. 



(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for 

 expedite use and assurance sake, discovering the more siibtle 

 forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, 

 which is that which is termed clenches. For although in the 

 more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh 

 the comparison well) as in juggling feats, which, though we 

 know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it 

 seemeth to be ; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not 

 only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse 

 his judgment. 



(6) This part concerning clenches is excellently handled by 

 Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example ; 

 not only in the persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates 

 himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that 

 which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the 

 forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. And although we 

 have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it 

 is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and 

 contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt 

 is of very great advantage, though the difference be good which 

 was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as 

 the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the 

 other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as 

 it is the advantage of the weaker creature. 



(7) But yet further, this doctrine of clenches hath a more 

 ample latitude and extent than is perceived ; namely, unto 

 divers parts of knowledge, whereof some are laboured and 

 other omitted. For first, I conceive (though it may seem at 

 first somewhat strange) thaij that part which is variably re 

 ferred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching 

 the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elenche ; for the 

 great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambigiiity 

 of words and phrase, specially of such words as are most 

 general and intervene in every inquiry, it seemeth to me that 

 the true and fruitful use (leaving vain subtleties and specula 

 tions) of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, pos 

 teriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, 

 existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against 

 ambiguities of speech. So, again, the distribution of things 

 into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, 



