THE SECOND BOOK. 119 



are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and 

 divisions. 



(8) Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the 

 strength of the impression, and not by the subtlety of the 

 jllaqueation not so much perplexing the reason, as overruling 

 it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more 

 proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric. 



(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and pro- 

 )und kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not 



observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as 

 that which of all others appertained most to rectify judgment 

 the force whereof is such as it doth not dazzle or snare the 

 understanding m some particulars, but doth more generally 

 and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the 

 mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass 

 wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their 

 true incidence ; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full 

 of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and re 

 duced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances 

 that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, 

 beholding them in an example or two ; as first, in that instance 

 which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to the nature 

 of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or 

 active to affect more than the negative or privative. So that 

 a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failin- or 

 absence, as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed 

 him in Neptune s temple the great number of pictures of such 

 as had escaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune 

 saying, &quot;Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate 

 Neptune in tempest.&quot; &quot; Yea, but,&quot; saith Diagoras, &quot;where 

 are they painted that are drowned ? &quot; Let us behold it in 

 another instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an 

 equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and fei&amp;lt;m 

 m nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. 

 Hence it cometh that the mathematicians cannot satisfy them 

 selves except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to 

 perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be dis 

 charged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh that whereas there are 

 many things in Nature as it were monodica, sui juris, yet the 

 cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels and 

 conjugates, whereas no such thing is ; as they have feigned av 

 element of fire to keep square with earth, water, and air, and 

 the like. Nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a 

 number of fictions and fantasies the similitude of human 

 actions and arts, together with the making of man communu 



