THE SECOND BOOK. 121 



but cautions) doth extremely import the true conduct of human 

 judgment. The particular clenches or cautions against these 

 three false appearances I find altogether deficient. 



(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excel 

 lency which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I 

 may report that also deficient ; which is the application of the 

 differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects. 

 For there being but four kinds of demonstrations, that is, by 

 the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by induction, by 

 syllogism, and by congruity, which is that which Aristotle 

 calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not a notioribus, 

 every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, 

 in which respectively they have chiefest use ; and certain 

 others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded ; 

 and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe 

 proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting 

 ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been 

 amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to 

 knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstra 

 tions according to the analogy of sciences I note as deficient. 



XV. (1) The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in 

 writing or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the 

 nature of the character and the order of the entry. For the 

 art of characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it 

 hath nearest conjugation with grammar, and, therefore, I 

 refer it to the due place ; for the disposition and collocation 

 of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth 

 in a good digest of common-places, wherein I am not ignorant 

 of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, 

 as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxa 

 tion of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in 

 knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep 

 and full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of 

 great use and essence in studying, as that which assureth copy of 

 invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this 

 is true, that of the methods of common- places that I have 

 seen, there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying 

 merely the face of a school and not of a world ; and referring 

 to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life or 

 respect to action. 



(2) For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, 

 which is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly 

 inquired of. An art there is extant of it ; but it seemeth to 

 me that there are better precepts than that art, and better 

 practices of that art than those received. It is certain the art 



