THE SECOND BOOK. 143 



difference, which hath neither been well judged of nor well 



P X ired ^ r * he g d o f , fro i*&amp;lt;* &amp;lt;* contentment is JlaTe 

 either m the smcereness of the fruition, or in the quickness 

 and vigour of it ; the one superinduced by equality the other 

 by vicissitude ; the one having less mixt^of evil the other 

 more impression of good. Whether of these is the greater 

 good is a question controverted; but whether man s nature 

 may not be capable of both is a question not S^SX* 

 JS f h S for ? 6r &amp;lt; 3 ue . stio ? }&amp;gt; ein g debated between Socrates and a 

 soph st Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace 

 of mind and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying 

 they fell from argument to ill words : the sophist saving that 

 Socrates felicity was the felicity of a block or stone* and 

 Socrates saying that the sophist s felicity was the felicity of 



r/KAf the itC ^ Wh did nothi ^ ^ itch Ld cSch 

 And both these opinions do not want their supports For the 

 opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the^eneml consent 

 even of the epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great 

 part in felicity ; and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath mor 

 use in clearing perturbations then in compassing desires The 



spat of CT d T C d faV Ured by * he as ertion we *&quot;* 

 pake of, that good of advancement is greater than good of 



simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a 



pro 



(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh 

 the former superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there 

 otheTand J^ m E P ^ S in ^^ P^sures than som^ 

 yeeVrthele are leSS troubled i 



thpQ . troubled e 



them ? So as this same, Non uti ut non a 



ds t &quot;? SUU anm * illi &amp;lt;* didenUs. 



And it seemeth to me that most of the doctrines of the philo 

 sophers are more fearful and cautionary than the nature of 

 things requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in 

 Sfr Tl I T^ 1 - v r When they would have a ma ^ s whole 

 make me^thint? 1 ^ P re P ara . n to di ^ they must needs 

 make men think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom 

 there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet :- 



if 116 &quot; 1 Vit8B extremum inter munera ponat 



So have they sought to make men s minds too uniform and 

 harmomcal by not breaking them sufficiently to contrarv 

 motions; the reasons whereof I suppose to bef because they 



