THE SECOND BOOK. 147 



not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the 

 framing of the mind of particular persons. 



(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth 

 handle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively ; where- 

 unto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and 

 person, case and case, particular and public. As we see in the 

 proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was 

 so much extolled, yet what was said ? 



&quot; Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.&quot; 



So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, 

 we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain 

 whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to 

 be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching 

 the killing of a tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in 

 opinion ; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, 

 and others that tyranny was better than a civil war : and a 

 number of the like cases there are of comparative duty. 

 Amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where 

 the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small in 

 justice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the 

 truth: Aliqua suntinjustefacienda, utmulta juste fieri possint. 

 But the reply is good : Auctorem prcesentis justiti& habes, 

 sponsorem futurce non habes. Men must pursue things which 

 are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine Pro 

 vidence. So then we pass on from this general part touching 

 the exemplar and description of good. 



XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit 

 of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth 

 thereunto, without which part the former seemeth to be no 

 better than a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to 

 contemplate, but is without life and motion ; whereunto 

 Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words : Necesse est scilicet 

 de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile 

 enim fere fuerit vi/rtutem quidem nosse, acquirendce autem ejus 

 modos et vias ignorare. Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie 

 sit, quterendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat : utrumque 

 enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri : hoc 

 autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo. 

 In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate 

 this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the 

 second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, Non ita 

 disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi. And although the neglect of 

 our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching 



