THE SECOND BOOX. 149 



But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull 

 and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, 

 which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that 

 which seemeth adverse and contrary ; which is that properly 

 which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom 

 of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct 

 knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we 

 do apply ; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take 

 measure of the body. 



(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down 

 sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several 

 characters and tempers of men s natures and dispositions, 

 specially having regard to those differences which are most 

 radical in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most 

 frequent in concurrence or commixture ; wherein it is not 

 the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe 

 the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For 

 if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are 

 proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which 

 Aristotle handleth, or ought to have handled, by the name of 

 magnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be considered 

 that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, 

 and others to few ? So that some can divide themselves : 

 others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in 

 few things at once ; and so there coineth to be a narrowness of 

 mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds 

 are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or 

 within a short return of time ; others to that which begins afar 

 off, and is to be won with length of pursuit : 



&quot; Jam turn tenditque fovetque.&quot; 



So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is 

 commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further 

 deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, &quot; That there is a 

 disposition in conversation (supposing it in things which do in 

 no sort touch or concern a man s self) to soothe and please, 

 and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross ; &quot; and 

 deserveth it not much better to be considered. &quot; That there is 

 a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more 

 serious nature (and supposing it still in things merely in 

 different), to take pleasure in the good of another ; and a dis 

 position contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another ? &quot; 

 which is that properly which we call good nature or ill nature, 

 benignity or malignity ; and, therefore, I cannot sufficiently 



