THE SECOND BOOK. 153 



of manners he handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. 

 But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in 

 habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner 

 of superinducing that habit : for there be many precepts 

 of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is 

 of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite 

 a few. 



(9) The first shall be, that we beware w? take not at the 

 first either too high a strain or too weak : for if too high, in a 

 diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you 

 breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth ; and in all natures 

 you breed a further expectation than can hold out, and so an 

 insatisfaction in the end : if too weak, of the other side, you 

 may not look to perform and overcome any great task. 



(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two 

 several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the 

 other when it is worst disposed ; that by the one you may gain 

 a great step, by the other you may work out the knots and 

 stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy 

 and pleasant. 



(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by 

 the way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme 

 of that whereunto we are by nature inclined ; like unto the 

 rowing against the stream, or making a wand straight by 

 bending him contrary to his natural crookednesss. 



(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to any 

 thing better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that 

 whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but 

 tanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred of the 

 mind against necessity and constraint. Many other axioms 

 there are touching the managing of exercise and custom, 

 which being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature ; 

 but, being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but 

 an ape of Nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and 

 counterfeit. 



(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what 

 influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not 

 divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining 

 thereunto ? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation 

 call poesy vinum dcemonum, because it increaseth temptations, 

 perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of 

 Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, &quot; That 

 young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, because 

 they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, 

 nor attempered with time and experience &quot; ? And doth it not 



