182 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 



XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the 

 reason as to the will of man : so that as we are to obey His law, 

 though we find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe 

 His word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if 

 we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense we give 

 consent to the matter, and not to the author ; which is no more 

 than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness ; 

 but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteous 

 ness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein 

 was an image of natural reason. 



(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it 

 is to believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge 

 man s mind suffereth from sense : but in belief it suffereth 

 from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorised than 

 itself and so suffereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise it 

 is of the state of man glorified ; for then faith shall cease, and 

 we shall know as we are known. 



(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in 

 our idiom we call divinity) is grounded only upon the word 

 and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature : for it is 

 written, Gceli enarrant cjloriam Dei; but it is not written, 

 Cceli enarrant voluntatem Dei : but of that it is said, Ad legem 

 et testimonium : si non fecerint secundum verbum istud, &c. 

 This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern 

 the great mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the re 

 demption, but likewise those which concern the law moral, 

 truly interpreted : Love your enemies : do good to them 

 that hate you ; be like to your heavenly Father, that suf 

 fereth His rain to fall upon the just and unjust.&quot; To this it 

 ought to be applauded, Nee vox hominem sonat : it is a voice 

 beyond the light of natiire. So we see the heathen poets, 

 when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate 

 with laws and moralities, as if they were opposite and malig 

 nant to nature : Et quod natura remittit, invida jura negant. 

 So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander s messengers, 

 that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other 

 of the wise men of Graecia, and that he held them for excellent 

 men : but that they had a fault, which was that they had in 

 too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and 

 manners. So it must be confessed that a great part of the 

 law moral is of that perfection whereunto the light of nature 

 cannot aspire : how then is it that man is said to have, by the 

 light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue 

 and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because 

 the light of nature is used in two several senses : the one, that 



