OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [ll. 3. 



Quintus could not hear spoken with patience, terming 

 them inventions against religion and the moral virtues ; 

 yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect 

 in those same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, 

 and moral virtue, which if they be well and watchfully 

 pursued, there will be seldom use of those other, no more 

 than of physic in a sound or well-dieted body. Neither 

 ^ can the experience of one man s life furnish examples and 

 precedents for the events of one man s life. For as it 

 happeneth sometimes that the grandchild, or other de 

 scendant, resembleth the ancestor more than the son ; so 

 many times occurrences of present times may sort better 

 with ancient examples than with those of the later or 

 immediate times : and lastly, the wit of one man can no 

 more countervail learning than one man s means can hold 

 way with a common purse. 



4. And as for those particular seducements or indis 

 positions of the mind for policy and government, which 

 learning is pretended to insinuate; if it be granted that 

 any such thing be, it must be remembered withal, that 

 learning ministereth in every of them greater strength 

 of medicine or remedy than it offereth cause of indis 

 position or infirmity. For if by a secret operation it make 

 men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side by plain 

 precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to 

 resolve ; yea, and how to carry things in suspense without 

 prejudice, till they resolve. If it make men positive and 

 regular, it teacheth them what things are in their nature 

 demonstrative, and what are conjectural, and as well the 

 use of distinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of 

 principles and rules. ZI^L mislead by disproportji 

 dissimilitude of examples, it teacheth men the fjqcse-ef 

 rors ul cOinpafisons, and all the 



