III. 4 .] THE SECOND BOOK. IOI 



I do not insist, because I have no deficiences to propound 

 concerning them. 



5. Thus much therefore concerning history, which is 

 that part of learning which answereth to one of the cells, 

 domiciles, or offices of the mind of man ; which is that 

 of the memory. 



IV. i. Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words 

 for the most part restrained, but in all other points ex 

 tremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the imagination ; 

 which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may at plea 

 sure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that 

 which nature hath joined ; and so make unlawful matches 

 and divorces of things ; Picioribus atque poetis, &c. It 

 is taken in two senses in respect of words or matter. 

 In the first sense it is but a character of style, and be- 

 longeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the 

 present. In the latter it is (as hath been said) one of the 

 principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but 

 feigned history, which may be styled as well in prose as 

 in verse. 



2. The use of this feigned history hath been to give 

 some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those 

 points wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the 

 world being in proportion inferior to the soul ; by reason 

 whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more 

 ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more 

 absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of 

 things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true 

 history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind 

 of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more 

 heroical. Because true history propouncleth the successes 

 and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of 

 virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in 



