Il8 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VII. 6. 



the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And 

 therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and 

 Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all things 

 by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that know 

 ledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, 

 which appeareth to be metaphysic; as that which con- 

 sidereth the simple forms or differences of things, which 

 are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations 

 whereof make all this variety. The second respect, which 

 valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysic, is that 

 it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest 

 liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physic 

 carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to 

 many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary 

 flexuous courses of nature. But lata undique sunt sapienti- 

 lus VICE: to sapience (which was anciently defined to be 

 rerum divinarum et humanarum scientid) there is ever 

 choice of means. For physical causes give light to new 

 invention in simili mater ia. But whosoever knoweth any 

 form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that 

 nature upon any variety of matter ; and so is less re 

 strained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, 

 or the condition of the efficient ; which kind of knowledge 

 Salomon likewise, though in a more divine sense, elegantly 

 describeth; non arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non 

 habebis offendiculum. The ways of sapience are not much 

 liable either to particularity or chance. 



7. The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of 

 final causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted 

 but as misplaced. And yet if it were but a fault in order, 

 I would not speak of it : for order is matter of illustration, 

 but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this 

 misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great 



