\l6 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [VIII. 5. 



5. But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy 

 according to the report of the inquiry, and nothing con 

 cerning the matter or subject : and that is positive and 

 considerative ; when the inquiry reporteth either an asser 

 tion or a doubt. These doubts or non liquels are of two 

 sorts, particular and total. For the first, we see a good 

 example thereof in Aristotle s Problems, which deserved 

 to have had a better continuance; but so nevertheless 

 as there is one point whereof warning is to be given and 

 taken. The registering of doubts hath two excellent 

 uses : the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors and 

 falsehoods ; when that which is not fully appearing is not 

 collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, 

 but reserved in doubt : the other, that the entry of doubts 

 are as so many suckers or sponges to draw use of know 

 ledge ; insomuch as that which, if doubts had not pre 

 ceded, a man should never have advised, but passed it 

 over without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of 

 doubts is made to be attended and applied. But both 

 these commodities do scarcely countervail an inconveni 

 ence, which will intrude itself if it be not debarred ; which 

 is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour rather 

 how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it ; and 

 accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar 

 example in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have 

 once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for 

 a doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be 

 allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, 

 and not those which labour to make certain things doubt 

 ful. Therefore these kalendars of doubts I commend 

 as excellent things ; so that there be this caution used, 

 that when they be throughly sifted and brought to resolu 

 tion, they be from thenceforth omitted, decarded, and not 



