VIII. 5-J THE SECOND BOOK. 129 



revived, with some alterations and demonstrations, the 

 opinions of Xenophanes; and any other worthy to be 

 admitted. 



6. Thus have we now dealt with two of the three 

 beams of man s knowledge ; that is radius direc/us, which 

 is referred to nature, radius refradus, which is referred to 

 God, and cannot report truly because of the inequality of 

 the medium. There resteth radius reflexus, whereby man 

 beholdeth and contemplateth himself. 



IX. i. We come therefore now to that knowledge 

 whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the 

 knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more ac 

 curate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. 

 This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural phi 

 losophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is 

 but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of 

 nature. And generally let this be a rule, that all partitions 

 of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and veins than 

 for sections and separations; and that the continuance 

 and entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the 

 contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to become 

 barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they have not been 

 nourished and maintained from the common fountain. 

 So we see Cicero the orator complained of Socrates and 

 his school, that he was the first that separated philosophy 

 and rhetoric ; whereupon rhetoric became an empty and 

 verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of Copernicus 

 touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy itself 

 cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the 

 phainomena, yet natural philosophy may correct. So we 

 see also that the science of medicine if it be destituted 

 and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not much better 

 than an empirical practice. With this reservation therefore 



I 



