148 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XII. i. 



wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like 

 nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance 

 of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from 

 the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any 

 science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagin 

 ation, I see no cause to alter the former division. For 

 as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination, 

 than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we 

 speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagin 

 ation produceth, but of such sciences as handle and con 

 sider of the imagination. No more than we shall speak 

 now of such knowledges as reason produceth (for that 

 extendeth to all philosophy), but of such knowledges as 

 do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason : so as 

 poesy had his true place. As for the power of the 

 imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the 

 same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, 

 whereunto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imagin 

 ative or insinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, 

 we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. So there 

 fore we content ourselves with the former division, that 

 human philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the 

 mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral. 



2. The part of human philosophy which is rational, is 

 of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, 

 and seemeth but a net of subtility and spinosity. For as 

 it was truly said, that knowledge is pabulum animi ; so in 

 the nature of men s appetite to this food, most men are 

 of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, 

 that would fain have returned ad olios carnium, and were 

 weary of manna ; which, though it were celestial, yet 

 seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men 

 taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, 



