XIII. 6.] THE SECOND BOOK. 155 



6. The invention of speech or argument is not properly 

 an invention : for to invent is to discover that we know 

 not, and not to recover or resummon that which we 

 already know : and the use of this invention is no other 

 but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already 

 possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may 

 be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our con 

 sideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a 

 remembrance or suggestion, with an application ; which 

 is the cause why the schools do place it after judgement, 

 as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because 

 we do account it a chase as well of deer in an inclosed 

 park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already 

 obtained the name, let it be called invention : so as it 

 be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of 

 this invention is readiness and present use of our know 

 ledge, and not addition or amplification thereof. 



7. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are 

 two courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of 

 these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting 

 rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And 

 herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the 

 Sophists near his time, saying, They did as if one that 

 professed the art of shoe-making should not teach how to 

 make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of 

 shoes of all fashions and sizes. But yet a man might reply, 

 that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, 

 but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly 

 customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine know 

 ledge, saith, That the kingdom of heaven is like a good house 

 holder, that bringeth forth both new and old store : and we 

 see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, 

 that pleaders should have the places, whereof they have 



