XIII. 9-] THE SECOND BOOK. 157 



knowledge. For as Plato saith, Whosoever seeketh, knowcth 

 that which he seekethfor in a general notion : else how shall 

 he know it when he hath found it? And therefore the larger 

 your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is 

 your search. But the same places which will help us 

 what to produce of that which we know already, will also 

 help us, if a man of experience were before us, what ques 

 tions to ask ; or, if we have books and authors to instruct 

 us, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot 

 report that this part of invention, which is that which the 

 schools call topics, is deficient. 



10. Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and 

 special. The general we have spoken to; but the par 

 ticular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally 

 as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which ~l 

 hath reigned too much in the schools (which is, to be 

 vainly subtile in a few things which are within their com 

 mand, and to reject the rest), I do receive particular 

 topics, that is, places or directions of invention and \ 

 inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great 

 use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences. J 

 For in these it holdeth, ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis; 

 for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of 

 the way which is passed, but we gain the better sight of 

 that part of the way which remaineth : so every degree of 

 proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which fol- 

 loweth ; which light if we strengthen by drawing it forth 

 into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance 

 our pursuit. 



XIV. i. Now we pass unto the arts of judgement, 

 which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations ; 

 which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention. 

 For in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the 



