158 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XIV. i. 



same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all 

 one as in the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syl 

 logism ; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, 

 the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judge 

 ment of the consequence is another; the one exciting 

 only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and 

 exact form of judgement, we refer ourselves to that which 

 we have spoken of interpretation of nature. 



2. For the other judgement by syllogism, as it is a 

 thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been 

 vehemently and excellently laboured. For the nature of 

 man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his under 

 standing fixed and unmoveable, and as a rest and support 

 of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to 

 prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent ; 

 and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas 

 (that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to 

 be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon 

 the conversion is accomplished r so assuredly men have a 

 desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them 

 from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of 

 falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down some 

 principles about which the variety of their disputations 

 might turn. 



3. So then this art of judgement is but the reduction of 

 propositions to principles in a middle term. The prin 

 ciples to be agreed by all and exempted from argument ; 

 the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man s 

 invention ; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and 

 inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to 

 the principle, which they term a probation ostensive ; the 

 other, when the contradictory of the proposition is re 

 duced to the contradictory of the principle, which is 



