XIV. 3-] THE SECOND BOOK. 159 



that which they call per incommodum, or pressing an ab 

 surdity; the number of middle terms to be as the pro 

 position standeth degrees more or less removed from 

 the principle. 



4. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, 

 the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution ; 

 the former frameth and setteth down a true form of con 

 sequence, by the variations and deflections from which 

 errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. To 

 ward the composition and structure of which form, it is 

 incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propos 

 itions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple 

 words. And this is that part of logic which is compre 

 hended in the Analytics. 



5. The second method of doctrine was introduced for 

 expedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more 

 subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their 

 redargutions, which is that which is termed clenches. For 

 although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth 

 (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling 

 feats, which, though we know not how they are done, 

 yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be ; yet the 

 more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man besides 

 his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgement. 



6. This part concerning elenches is excellently handled 

 by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in 

 example ; not only in the persons of the Sophists, but even 

 in Socrates himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, 

 but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath 

 exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and 

 redargution. And although we have said that the use of 

 this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the de 

 generate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, 



