XIV. 9 .] THE SECOND BOOK. l6l 



place here, as that which of all others appertained most 

 to rectify judgement: the force whereof is such, as it 

 doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some par 

 ticulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and 

 corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far [ 

 from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the \ 

 beams of things should reflect according to their true 

 incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full 

 of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and 

 reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false ap 

 pearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature 

 of the mind, beholding them in an example or two ; as 

 first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, 

 namely, that to the nature of the mind of all men it is 

 consonant for the affirmative or active to affect more than 

 the negative or privative. So that a few times hitting or 

 presence, countervails oft-times failing or absence ; as was 

 well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in 

 Neptune s temple the great number of pictures of such as 

 had scaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Nep 

 tune, saying, Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate 

 Neptune in tempest. Yea, but (saith Diagoras) where are 

 they painted that are drowned? Let us behold it in another 

 instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an equal ~ 

 and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in 

 nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. 

 Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot satisfy 

 themselves except they reduce the motions of the celestial 

 bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labour 

 ing to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh, that 

 whereas there are many things in nature, as it were 

 monodica, sui juris ; yet the cogitations of man do feign 

 unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no 



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