XIV. to.] THE SECOND BOOK. 163 



peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first 

 book. 



n. And lastly, let us consider the false appearances 

 that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed 

 and applied according to the conceit and capacities of 

 the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our 

 words, and prescribe it well loquendum ut vulgus senti- 

 endum ut sapientes ; yet certain it is that words, as a 

 Tartar s bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of 

 the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judge 

 ment. So as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and 

 disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, 

 in setting down in the very beginning the definitions 

 of our words and terms, that others may know how 

 we accept and understand them, and whether they con 

 cur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want 

 of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to 

 have begun, which is, in questions and differences about 

 words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that 

 it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies \ 

 and false appearances, because they are inseparable from 

 our nature and condition of life ; so yet nevertheless the 



caution of them (for all clenches as was said. 



Elenchi 

 are but cautions) doth extremely import the magn i s t ve 



true conduct of human judgement. The de idolis ani- 



particular clenches or cautions against these mi bumani 



three false appearances, I find altogether nal s et 



deficient. adventitiis. 



12. There remaineth one part of judgement of great 

 excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly 

 touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is the 

 application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing 

 kinds of subjects. For there being but four kinds of 

 M 2 



