170 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XVI. 7. 



and scarcely regarded ; so these arts, being here placed 

 with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty 

 things ; yet to such as have chosen them to spend their 

 labours and studies in them, they seem great matters. 



XVII. i. For the method of tradition, I see it hath 

 moved a controversy in our time. But as in civil busi 

 ness, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there 

 is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no 

 proceeding at all ; so in learning, where there is much 

 controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this 

 part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly 

 inquired as I shall report it deficient. 



2. Method hath been placed and that not amiss, in 

 logic, as a part of judgement. For as the doctrine of 

 syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgement upon 

 that which is invented, so the doctrine of method con- 

 taineth the rules of judgement upon that which is to be 

 delivered ; for judgement precedeth delivery, as it follow- 

 eth invention. Neither is the method or the nature of 

 the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but 

 likewise to the progression of knowledge : for since the 

 labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of 

 knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which in 

 spired the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And 

 therefore the most real diversity of method is of method 

 referred to use, and method referred to progression : 

 whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other 

 of probation. 



3. The latter whereof seemeth to be via deserta et inter- 

 clusa. For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a 

 kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the 

 receiver. For he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to 

 deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not 



