XVII.I2.] THE SECOND BOOK. 175 



12. But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, 

 doth further belong not only the architecture of the whole 

 frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns 

 thereof: not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and 

 figure. And therefore method considereth not only the 

 disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the 

 propositions : not as to their truth or matter, but as to 

 their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited 

 better a great deal in reviving the good rules of proposi 

 tions, Ka06\ov npuTov, Kara iravros &c., than he did in intro 

 ducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the 

 condition of human things that, according to the ancient 

 fables, the most precious things have the most pernicious 

 keepers] it was so, that the attempt of the one made him 

 fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted 

 that should design to make axioms convertible, if he 

 make them not withal circular, and non-promovent, or 

 incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was 

 excellent. 



13. The other considerations of method, concerning 

 propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost proposi 

 tions, which limit the dimensions of sciences : for every 

 knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity 

 (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it 

 solid), to have a longitude and a latitude ; accounting 

 the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude 

 towards action ; that is, from the greatest generality to 

 the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how 

 far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the pro 

 vince of another, which is the rule they call KaOavro ; the 

 other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a 

 knowledge should descend : which latter I find passed 

 over in silence, being in my judgement the more material. 



