XVI If. 4.] THE SECOND BOOK. 179 



reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence 

 of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination 

 from the affections part, and contract a confederacy be 

 tween the reason and imagination against the affections ; 

 for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to 

 good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection 

 beholdeth merely the present ; reason beholdeth the future 

 and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the 

 imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished ; but 

 after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made 

 things future and remote appear as present, then upon 

 the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth. 



5. We conclude therefore that rhetoric can be no 

 more charged with the colouring of the worse part, than 

 logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know 

 the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use 

 be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from 

 rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close, 

 the other at large; but much more in this, that logic 

 handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth 

 it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And 

 therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between 

 logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on 

 the other, as participating of both : for the proofs and 

 demonstrations of logic are toward all men indifferent 

 and the same ; but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric 

 ought to differ according to the auditors : 



Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion. 



Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend 

 so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to 

 several persons, he should speak to them all respectively 

 and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence 

 N 2 



