XIX. 3.] THE SECOND BOOK. 185 



rational knowledges ; wherein if I have made the divi 

 sions other than those that are received, yet would I not 

 be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not 

 use. For there is a double necessity imposed upon me 

 of altering the divisions. The one, because it differeth 

 in end and purpose, to sort together those things which 

 are next in nature, and those things which are next in 

 use. For if a secretary of estate should sort his papers, 

 it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort 

 together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, &c. 

 But in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort 

 together those that he were like to use together, though 

 of several natures. So in this general cabinet of know 

 ledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of 

 the nature of things ; whereas if myself had been to 

 handle any particular knowledge, I would have respected 

 the divisions fittest for use. The other, because the 

 bringing in of the deficiences did by consequence alter 

 the partitions of the rest. For let the knowledge extant 

 (for demonstration sake) be fifteen. Let the knowledge 

 with the deficiences be twenty; the parts of fifteen are 

 not the parts of twenty ; for the parts of fifteen are three 

 and five ; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. 

 So as these things are without contradiction, and could 

 not otherwise be. 



XX. i. &quot;V\/E proceed now to that knowledge which 



considereth of the appetite and will of 

 man: whereof Salomon saith, Ante omnia.fili, cuslodi cor 

 tuum ; nam inde procedunt ac Hones vita. In the handling 

 of this science, those which have written seem to me to 

 have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, 

 did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters 



