196 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXI. 3. 



man s nature may not be capable of both, is a question 

 not inquired. 



4. The former question being debated between Socrates 

 and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and 

 constant peace of mind, and the sophist in much de 

 siring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill 

 words : the sophist saying that Socrates felicity was the 

 felicity of a block or stone ; and Socrates saying that 

 the sophist s felicity was the felicity of one that had the 

 itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both 

 these opinions do not want their supports. For the 

 opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general con 

 sent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue bear- 

 eth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that 

 virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than 

 in compassing desires. The sophist s opinion is much 

 favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of 

 advancement is greater than good of simple preservation ; 

 because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advance 

 ment, as motion though in a circle hath a show of pro 

 gression. 



5. But the second question, decided the true way, 

 maketh the former superfluous. For can it be doubted, 

 but that there are some who take more pleasure in en 

 joying pleasures than some other, and yet, nevertheless, 

 are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them ? So 

 as this same, Non uti ut non appetas, non appetere ut non 

 meiuas, sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis. And it seemeth 

 to me, that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are 

 more fearful and cautionary than the nature of things 

 requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in 

 offering to cure it. For when they would have a man s 

 whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, 



I 



