XXII. 4.] THE SECOND BOOK. 



of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or com 

 mixture ; wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in 

 passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, 

 that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be 

 considered, that there are minds which are proportioned 

 to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle 

 handleth or ought to have handled by the name of 

 magnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be con 

 sidered, that there are minds proportioned to intend many 

 matters, and others to few? So that some can divide 

 themselves : others can perchance do exactly well, but it 

 must be but in few things at once : and so there cometh 

 to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. 

 And again, that some minds are proportioned to that 

 which may be dispatched at once, or within a short 

 return of time ; others to that which begins afar off, and 

 is to be won with length of pursuit : 



Jam turn tenditque fovetque. 



So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which 

 is commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So 

 further deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, That 

 there is a disposition in conversation (supposing it in things 

 which do in no sort touch or concern a man s self) to soothe 

 and please; and a disposition contrary to contradict and 

 cross: and deserveth it not much better to be considered, 

 Thai there is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but 

 in matter of more serious nature (and supposing it still in 

 things merely indifferent), to take pleasure in the good of 

 another: and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at 

 the good of another? which is that properly which we call 

 good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity: and 

 therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of 

 knowledge, touching the several characters of natures 



