210 OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. [XXII. 8. 



8. The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent 

 opinion, that of those things which consist by nature, 

 nothing can be changed by custom ; using for example, 

 that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will 

 not learn to ascend ; and that by often seeing or hearing, 

 we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though 

 this principle be true in things wherein nature is per 

 emptory (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to 

 discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature 

 admitteth a latitude. For he mought see that a strait 

 glove will come more easily on with use; and that a 

 wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew ; and that 

 by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger ; and 

 that by use of enduring heat or cold, we endure it the 

 better, and the like : which latter sort have a nearer re 

 semblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, 

 than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing 

 his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he 

 ought so much the more to have taught the manner of 

 superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts 

 of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there 

 is of ordering the exercises of the body ; whereof we will 

 recite a few. 



9. The first shall be, that we beware we take not at 

 the first, either too high a strain, or too weak: for if 

 too high, in a diffident nature you discourage, in a con 

 fident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a 

 sloth ; and in all natures you breed a further expectation 

 than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end : if 

 too weak, of the other side, you may not look to perform 

 and overcome any great task. 



10. Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at 

 two several times, the one when the mind is best dis- 



