NECESSITY OF AN ANALYSIS OF NAMES. 21 



square&quot; does not include the meaning of &quot; a round square 

 exists,&quot; for it does not and cannot exist. When I say &quot; the 

 sun,&quot; &quot; my father,&quot; or a &quot; round square,&quot; I do not call upon 

 the hearer for any belief or disbelief, nor can either the one or 

 the other be afforded me ; but if I say, &quot; the sun exists,&quot; &quot; my 

 father exists,&quot; or &quot; a round square exists,&quot; I call for belief ; 

 and should, in the first of the three instances, meet with it ; 

 in the second, with belief or disbelief, as the case might be ; in 

 the third, with disbelief. 



3. This first step in the analysis of the object of belief, 

 which, though so obvious, will be found to be not unimportant, 

 is the only one which we shall find it practicable to make with 

 out a preliminary survey of language. If we attempt to pro 

 ceed further in the same path, that is, to analyse any further 

 the import of Propositions ; we. find forced upon US T as a sub 

 ject of previous consideration, the import of Names, For 

 every proposition consists of two names; and every proposition 

 affirms or denies one of these names, of the other. Now what 

 we do, what passes in our mind, when we affirm or deny two 

 names of one another, must depend on what they are names 

 of; since it is with reference to that, and not to the mere 

 names themselves, that we make the affirmation or denial. 

 Here, therefore, we find a new reason why the signification of 

 names, and the relation generally between names and the 

 things signified by them, must occupy the preliminary stage 

 of the inquiry we are engaged in. 



It may be objected that the meaning of names can guide 

 us at most only to the opinions, possibly the foolish and 

 groundless opinions, which mankind have formed concerning 

 things, and that as the object of philosophy is truth, not 

 opinion, the philosopher should dismiss words and look into 

 things themselves, to ascertain what questions can be asked 

 and answered in regard to them. This advice (which no one 

 has it in his power to follow) is in reality an exhortation to 

 discard the whole fruits of the labours of his predecessors, and 

 conduct himself as if he were the first person who had ever 

 turned an inquiring eye upon nature. What does any one s 



