CHAPTER II. 



OF NAMES. 



1. &quot;A NAME,&quot; says Hobbes,* &quot;is a word taken at 

 pleasure to serve for a mark which may raise in our mind a 

 thought like to some thought we had before, and which being 

 pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought 

 the speaker hadf before in his mind.&quot; This simple definition 

 of a name, as a word (or set of words) serving the double pur-] 

 pose of a mark to recall to ourselves the likeness of a forme 

 thought, and a sign to make it known to others, appears un 

 exceptionable. Names, indeed, do much more than this ; bu 

 whatever else they do, grows out of, and is the result of this : 

 as will appear in its proper place. 



Are names more properly said to be the names of things, 

 or of our ideas of things ? The first is the expression in com 

 mon use ; the last is that of some metaphysicians, who con 

 ceived that in adopting it they were introducing a highly 

 important distinction. The eminent thinker, just quoted, 

 seems to countenance the latter opinion. &quot; But seeing.&quot; he 

 continues, &quot; names ordered in speech (a.s is definejl) are signs. 

 of our conceptions, it is manifest J^ey are not signg_of_the 

 thj^g^_themselves_; for that the sound of this word stone should 

 be the sign of a stone, cannot be understood in any sense but 

 this, that he that hears it collects that he that pronounces it 

 thinks of a stone.&quot; 



If it be merely meant that the conception alone, and notf 

 the thing itself, is recalled by the name, or imparted to the\ 

 hearer, this of course cannot be denied. Nevertheless, there N\ 

 seems good reason for adhering to the common usage f and 



* Computation or Logic, chap. ii. 



t In the original &quot; had, or had not. &quot; These last words, as involving a 

 subtlety foreign to our present purpose, I have forborne to quote. 



