NAMES. 29 



4. The second general division of names is into con 

 crete and abstract. A concrete name is a name which stands 

 for a thing; an abstract name is a name which stands for an 

 attribute of a thing. Thus John, the sea, this table, are names 

 of things. White, also, is a name of a thing, or rather of 

 things. Whiteness, again, is the name of a quality or attri 

 bute of those things. Man is a name of many things ; 

 humanity is a name of an attribute of those things. Old 

 is a name of things; old age is a name of one of their 

 attributes. 



I have used the words concrete and abstract in the sense 

 annexed to them by the schoolmen, who, notwithstanding the 

 imperfections of their philosophy, were unrivalled in the con 

 struction of technical language, and whose definitions, in logic 

 at least, though they never went more than a little way into 

 the subject, have seldom, I think, been altered but to be 

 spoiled. A practice, however, has grown up in more modern 

 times, which, if not introduced by Locke, has gained currency 

 chiefly from his example, of applying the expression &quot; abstract 

 name&quot; to all names which are the result of abstraction or 

 generalization, and consequently to all general names, instead 

 of confining it to the names of attributes. The metaphysicians 

 of the Condillac school, whose admiration of Locke, passing 

 over the profoundest speculations of that truly original genius, 

 usually fastens with peculiar eagerness upon his weakest 

 points, have gone on imitating him in this abuse of language, 

 until there is now some difficulty in restoring the word to its 

 original signification. A more wanton alteration in the mean 

 ing of a word is rarely to be met with ; for the expression 

 general name, the exact equivalent of which exists in all lan 

 guages I am acquainted with, was already available for the 

 purpose to which abstract has been misappropriated, while the 

 misappropriation leaves that important class of words, the 

 names of attributes, without any compact distinctive appella 

 tion. The old acceptation, however, has not gone so com 

 pletely out of use, as to deprive those who still adhere to it of 

 all chance of being understood. By abstract, then, I shall I 

 always, in Logic, mean the opposite of concrete : by an ab- 



