THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 57 



sequence of these states of body, is not a state of body : that 

 which perceives and is conscious is called Mind. When sen 

 sations are called bodily feelings, it is only as being the class 

 of feelings which are immediately occasioned by bodily states ; 

 whereas the other kinds of feelings, thoughts, for instance, or 

 emotions, are immediately excited not by anything acting upon 

 the bodily organs, but by sensations, or by previous thoughts. 

 This, however, is a distinction not in our feelings, but in the 

 agency which produces our feelings: all of them when actually 

 produced are states of mind. 



Besides the affection of our bodily organs from without, 

 and the sensation thereby produced in our minds, many writers 

 admit a third link in the chain of phenomena, which they call 

 a Perception, and which consists in the recognition of an ex 

 ternal object as the exciting cause of the sensation. This per 

 ception, they say, is an act of the mind, proceeding from its 

 own spontaneous activity ; while in a sensation the mind is 

 passive, being merely acted upon by the outward object. And 

 according to some metaphysicians, it is by an act of the mind, 

 similar to perception, except in not being preceded by any sen 

 sation, that the existence of God, the soul, and other hyper- 

 physical objects is recognised. 



These acts of what is termed perception, whatever be the 

 conclusion ultimately come to respecting their nature, must, I 

 conceive, take their place among the varieties of feelings or 

 states of mind. In so classing them, I have not the smallest 

 intention of declaring or insinuating any theory as to the law 

 of mind in which these mental processes may be supposed to 

 originate, or the conditions under which they may be legiti 

 mate or the reverse. Far less do I mean (as Dr. Whewell 

 seems to suppose must be meant in an analogous case*) to in 

 dicate that as they are &quot;merely states of mind,&quot; it is super 

 fluous to inquire into their distinguishing peculiarities. I 

 abstain from the inquiry as irrelevant to the science of logic. 

 In these so-called perceptions, or direct recognitions by the 

 mind, of objects, whether physical or spiritual, which are ex- 



* Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i. p. 40. 



