

66 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



thing inherent in itself, or bear any affinity to its own nature. 

 A cause does not, as such, resemble its effects; an east wind 

 is not like the feeling of cold, nor heat like the steam of boil 

 ing water. Why then should matter resemble our sensations ? 

 Why should the inmost nature of fire or water resemble the 

 impressions made by those objects upon our senses ?* Or on 

 what principle are we authorized to deduce from the effects, 

 anything concerning the cause, except that it is a cause ade 

 quate to produce those effects ? It may, therefore, safely be 

 laid down as a truth both obvious in itself, and admitted by 

 all whom it is at present necessary to take into consideration, 

 that, of the outward world, we know and can know absolutely 

 nothing, except the sensations which we experience from it.f 



sujets sentants, il faudrait encore admettre que nul corps ne manifesterait ses 

 proprie tes autrement qu en relation avec un sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas 

 ses proprietes ne seraient encore que relatives: en sorte qu il me parait fort 

 raisonuable d admettre que les proprie te s de termine es des corps n existent pas 

 independamment d un sujet quelconque, et que quand on demande si les pro 

 prie te s de la matiere sont telles que nous les percevons, il faudrait voir aupara- 

 vant si elles sont en tant que de&quot;termin&amp;lt;Ses, et dans quel sens il est vrai de dire 

 qu elles sont.&quot; Cours d Histoire de la Philosophic Morale au 18me siecle, 8me 



169011. 



* Au attempt, indeed, has been made by Reid and others, to establish that 

 although some of the properties we ascribe to objects exist only in our sensa 

 tions, others exist in the things themselves, being such as cannot possibly be 

 copies of any impression upon the senses ; and they ask, from what sensations 

 our notions of extension and figure have been derived ? The gauntlet thrown 

 down by Reid was taken up by Brown, who, applying greater powers of ana 

 lysis than had previously been applied to the notions of extension and figure, 

 pointed out that the sensations from which those notions are derived, are sen 

 sations of touch, combined with sensations of a class previously too little adverted 

 to by metaphysicians, those which have their seat in our muscular frame. His 

 analysis, which was adopted and followed up by James Mill, has been further 

 and greatly improved upon in Professor Bain s profound work, The Senses and 

 the Intellect, and in the chapters on &quot; Perception&quot; of a work of eminent ana 

 lytic power, Mr. Herbert Spencer s Principles of Psychology. 



On this point M. Cousin may again be cited in favour of the better doctrine. 

 M. Cousin recognises, in opposition to Reid, the essential subjectivity of our 

 conceptions of what are called the primary qualities of matter, as extension, 

 solidity, &c., equally with those of colour, heat, and the remainder of the so- 

 called secondary qualities. Cours, ut supra, 9me lecon. 



f This doctrine, which is the most complete form of the philosophical theory 

 known as the Relativity of Human Knowledge, has, since the recent revival in 



