68 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



a particular statement of the sceptical system by which its 

 existence as a Thing in itself, distinct from the series of what 

 are denominated its states, is called in question. But it is 

 necessary to remark, that on the inmost nature (whatever be 

 meant by inmost nature) of the thinking principle, as well as 

 on the inmost nature of matter, we are, and with our faculties 

 must always remain, entirely in the dark. All which we are 

 aware of, even in our own minds, is (in the words of Mr. James 

 Mill) a certain &quot; thread of consciousness ;&quot; a series of feelings, 

 that is, of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions, more 

 or less numerous and complicated. There is a something I call 

 Myself, or, by another form of expression, my mind, which I 

 consider as distinct from these sensations, thoughts, &c. ; a 

 something which I conceive to be not the thoughts, but the 

 being that has the thoughts, and which I can conceive as 

 existing for ever in a state of quiescence, without any thoughts 

 at all. But what this being is, though it is myself, I have no 

 knowledge, other than the series of its states of consciousness. 

 As bodies manifest themselves to- me only through the sensa 

 tions of which I regard them as the causes, so the thinking 

 principle, or mind, in my own nature, makes itself known to 

 me only by the feelings of which it is conscious. I know 

 nothing about myself, save my capacities of feeling or being 

 conscious (including, of course, thinking and willing) : and 

 were I to learn anything new concerning my own nature, I 

 cannot with my present faculties conceive this new information 

 to be anything else, than that I have some additional capa 

 cities, as yet unknown to me, of feeling, thinking, or willing. 



Thus, then, as body is the unsentient cause to which we 

 are naturally prompted to refer a certain portion of our feel 

 ings, so mind may be described as the sentient subject (in the 

 scholastic sense of the term) of all feelings ; that which has or 

 feels them. But of the nature of either body or mind, further 

 than the feelings which the former excites, and which the 

 latter experiences, we do not, according to the best existing 

 doctrine, know anything ; and if anything, logic has nothing 

 to do with it, or with the manner in which the knowledge is 

 acquired. With this result we may conclude this portion of 



